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ABSTRACT
GPS tracking devices have become inexpensive, small, and can easily be attached to a
vehicle quickly. Law enforcement is increasingly using these devices to track the exact
location of a suspect's vehicle over a long period of time. In most instances, relying on
Supreme Court cases from the early 1980's, law enforcement has not sought a warrant
before using these devices. This paper examines how courts have attempted to apply
Supreme Court precedents based on "primitive" tracking devices to modern GPS tracking
devices. These precedents established that the use of electronic tracking devices on vehicles
did not constitute a search and, accordingly, did not implicate the Fourth Amendment
because people do not have a reasonable privacy interest in the movement of their vehicles
when traveling on a public roadway. Until recently, federal courts have, on the basis on
these decisions, almost universally upheld the use of GPS tracking devices. In contrast, state
courts have been more reluctant to follow these Supreme Court precedents. A recent
decision by the D.C. Circuit Court should cause future courts to re-examine the application
of the prior Supreme Court precedents. In this decision, the federal court recognized that
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of their movements over the
course of a period of time. The paper concludes that the approach taken by the D. C. Circuit
is most consistent with the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, because
sustained and long-term surveillance of a targeted individual unrelated to any particular
criminal action violates a reasonable expectation ofprivacy.
J.D., cur laude, Harvard University Law School, 1995, B.A., magna cur laude, University of
Pennsylvania, 1992. Vice President and General Counsel, the Lycurgus Group. Full biographical
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Q: You'll be using this Aston Martin DB with modifications. Now, pay
attention, please.... Here's a nice little transmitting device, called a homer.
You prime it hypressing that back like this. You see? The smaller model is now
standard field issue, to befitted into the heel of your shoe. Its larger brother is
magnetic. Right. It'll be concealed in the car you're trailing while you keep
out of sight. Reception on the dashboard here. Audiovisual range a hundred
and fifty miles.
Bond. Ingenious, and useful too. Allow a man to stop off for a quick one en
route.
Q: It has not been perfected out of years of patient research entirely for that
purpose...
INTRODUCTION
In Goldfinger, Q Branch supplies James Bond with two homing devices.2
These devices have a range of about 150 miles and allow Bond to follow
Auric Goldfinger's car from England to Switzerland. 3 After attaching the
magnetic device to Goldfinger's Rolls Royce, Bond could follow its
movements in his specially modified Aston Martin DB5 by accessing the
display hidden behind the speaker vent.4
The Goldfinger Bond would certainly be impressed by the advanced
tracking technology available to law enforcement today. Modern devices
are inexpensive, as small as the palm of a hand, can easily be attached to
vehicles, and have a long battery life. Not only can law enforcement
officials record where a vehicle has been, but they can also access a
vehicle's precise location in real-time through the Internet on maps and
satellite images.6 The devices also can set up "virtual fences" and notify an
1. GOLDFINGER (Eon Productions 1964).
2. See James Bond Multimedia, Goldfinger Gadgets,
http://www.jamesbondmm.co.uk/gadgets/goldfinger-gadgets (last visited Aug. 22, 2010); Universal
Exports, Goldfinger Gadgets, http://www.universalexports.net/Movies/goldfinger-gadgets.shtml (last
visited Aug. 22, 2010).
3. See Goldfinger Gadgets, supra note 2.
4. See id
5. See, e.g., Kate Bolduan, Is GPS a high-tech crime-fighting tool or Big Brother?, CNN.coM, Aug. 18,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/08/18/gps.tracking/index.html ("The technology is easy to use
and the devices are hard to detect. All police have to do is attach a GPS receiver to a suspect's car and
they easily go along for the ride online, tracking the individual's exact location in real time from their
computer.").
6. See id
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officer automatically when a vehicle enters or leaves a specified location.7
A recent article in a law enforcement magazine noted, "GPS technology is
at the core of many of the hottest emerging law enforcement technologies." 8
There is no doubt modern GPS tracking devices are useful to law
enforcement. These devices permit law enforcement to follow vehicles in
real-time and store data on time, position, and speed for later analysis. 9
Such information has helped to solve serious crimes.' 0  In 2008, for
example, the Los Angeles Times described how the Los Angeles County
7. Cf Jenna Kincade, GPS Tracking Devices for Children, GPS Tracking Resource,
http://www.gpstrackingresource.com/gps-tracking-devices-for-children (last visited Mar. 3, 2010) (GPS
technology allows parents to "set parameters and have a 'virtual' fence. If the child goes outside those
preset parameters an alarm is sent to the parent device immediately letting [the parent] know where [the]
child is."). Some examples of commercially available device include: the PT-200, sold by Rocky
Mountain Tracking, Inc., provides real-time tracking for a purchase price of $600 . Rocky Mountain
Tracking, Inc., PT-200, http://www.rmtracking.com/gpsproducts/pt-200.php (last visited Aug. 22, 2010).
The device is only 3.31" x 1.75" x 1", and the company claims that the device "retains its accuracy, even
inside containers and buildings that would normally affect whether or not the GPS data were reliable.
Rain and heavy weather also have little effect on the accuracy of the GPS data." Id. Additionally,
Trackingtheworld, Inc., sells "a completely self-contained real-time tracking system, ideal for covert
applications," which logs data including location, time, and speed for up to twenty days, and allows
police officer to view real-time data on any desktop or laptop PC. Tracking the World, Inc., WT Pro,
http://www.trackingtheworld.com/wtpro.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2010). Finally, Brickhouse
Security's Livewire FastTrac Coven GPS device permits alert notifications via text message or e-mail,
while allowing law enforcement officers to "access the device's GPS Location from anywhere in the
world and watch its movement in real-time. [Police] can even zoom in on the map for the exact street
location and speed, accurate up to 8 inches and 1/4 mph." Brickhouse Security, Livewire FastTrac
Covert GPS 120-day kit, http://www.brickhousesecurity.com/realtime-gpstracking-device.html (last
visited Aug. 22, 2010).
8. Kurt Smith, GPS Technology in Policing: Ride the Wave to Make Better Decisions, 46 POLICE CHIEF
4 (2009), available at
http://policechiefinagazine.org/magazine/index.cfmcategory ID=4&fuseaction=display&issue id-420
09.
9. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act contains no restrictions on the ability of law
enforcement install and monitor a tracking device. See 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2010). One court observed
that "[t]he only limit on such devices is the Fourth Amendment." In re Application of the United States
for an Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (D. Md.
2005). Furthermore, law enforcement officials must obtain a court order to obtain real-time and
historical location tracking information from personal cell phones. See Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting
a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement's Warrantless Use of GPS and
Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1081 82 & n.160 (2010) (collecting cases). The
Federal Government has taken the position that it may be able to request information from cell phone
based GPS device through a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2010). See In re Application of the
United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov't,
620 F.3d 304, 311 (3rd Cir. 2010).
10. See infra notes 11 12 and accompanying text.
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Sheriffs Office tracked a robbery suspect after planting a GPS unit in his
car. ' Similarly, the Washington Post reported police using GPS tracking
technology to crack a string of assaults on women in northern Virginia.
12
This paper will focus on recent significant developments in the law
surrounding the warrantless use of tracking devices as technology has
advanced from the primitive beeper-type device featured in Goldfinger to
the more potent, modern GPS device. Part I will discuss the Supreme
Court's treatment of the warrantless use of tracking devices. The Supreme
Court has, on two occasions, considered the use of electronic tracking
devices. 13 However, the Court has not considered whether law enforcement
must obtain a warrant before placing a GPS device on a private vehicle.
Part II will discuss focus on federal and state court applications of Supreme
Court precedent. While technology has advanced, lower courts seeking
guidance from the Supreme Court are forced to rely on decisions
interpreting what was cutting edge in the 1960s. Federal courts have, on the
basis on the Supreme Court decisions discussed in Part I, almost universally
upheld the use of GPS tracking devices. In contrast, state courts have been
more reluctant to follow such precedent. Part III will examine a recent
decision by the D.C. Circuit Court in which the court appeared to depart
from prior Supreme Court and federal decisions. Finally, Part IV will
attempt to predict how future courts will examine the warrantless use of
GPS tracking devices.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF GOLDFINGER-TYPE HOMING
DEVICES
United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo are the two United
States Supreme Court cases to have addressed Fourth Amendment
implications of police use of electronic tracking devices.
11. Carol J. Williams, Watch out for the snitch sitting on your dashboard: A GPS unit tells you where to
go. It also tells investigators where you've been, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 2008, at BI.
12. Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html. At the
time, one officer was quoted describing the technology as "a very new investigative tool." Id. Police in
Ohio also reported using GPS tracking technology to find the perpetrators of a string of burglaries, even
catching one burglary in the act. GPS tracking of car ivithout w1arrant contested, Columbus Dispatch,
Jan, 21, 2011, available at http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local news/stories/2011/01/20/gps-
tracking-of-car-without-warrant-contested.html?sid- 101.
13. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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A. Starting Point: The Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches without a
warrant. Accordingly, the use of GPS tracking devices implicates the
Fourth Amendment only if such use constitutes a search. A search is
deemed to have occurred "when an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. 14
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless
wiretapping of conversations in a phone booth violates the Fourth
Amendment.' 5  In doing so, the Court shifted from a property-based
analysis of the Fourth Amendment to a privacy-based analysis.16 The Court
initiated an inquiry that examined not how, but whether, the government
has violated an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.17 In his
concurrence, Justice Harlan explained that the relevant inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment has two parts: first, whether the person has "an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy," and second, whether the individual's
subjective expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."" 8 This approach is illustrated by Smith v.
Maryland, a case in which the Court notes the distinction between a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a telephone call and the
lack of an expectation of privacy in the actual phone numbers dialed.19
B. Knotts and Karo
In United States v. Knotts, the defendant and his co-conspirators were
suspected of manufacturing methamphetamine. 20 Law enforcement officers
contacted the chemical company where the conspirators intended to
purchase chemical supplies. 21 With the consent of the chemical company,
officers installed a tracking device inside a five-gallon drum of chemicals.22
14. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
15. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (examining whether an actual physical
invasion of property had occurred). But see Bennett L. Gershman, Privacy Revisited: GPS Tracking as
Search and Seizure, 30 PACE L. Rv. 927, 964 (2010) ("[T]he Katz test may be inadequate with respect
to intrusions into privacy interests that involve highly sophisticated surveillance technology.").
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51.
18. Id. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
20. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983).
21. Id. at 278.
22. Id.
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When Knotts' co-defendant purchased the drum of chemicals, the officers
were able to follow his car, "maintaining contact by using both visual
surveillance and a monitor which received the signals sent from the
beeper. 23
Relying in part upon the information obtained through the use of the
beeper, officers obtained a search warrant for the defendant's cabin.24 The
officers discovered a drug laboratory and chemicals necessary for the
manufacture of methamphetamine.25 Under a barrel outside the cabin,
officers located the five-gallon container with the beeper.26 The defendant
was subsequently convicted of drug charges.27
With the assistance of the tracking device, the officers were able to
follow the vehicle across state lines. 28 Although there is no description of
the exact capabilities of the device some have described it as primitive, as
its limitations are evident from two problems that soon developed in the
surveillance. 29 First, the driver may have suspected he was being followed
and "began making evasive maneuvers, [so] the pursuing agents ended their
visual surveillance. 3° Second, officers lost the signal from the beeper for
about one hour. The officers were able to re-establish contact with the
signal with the assistance of a monitoring device located in a helicopter. 31
32The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless use of the tracking device.
The Court viewed the extent of the activities by the law enforcement
officers as "amount[ing] principally to the following of an automobile on
public streets and highways. 33 The Court's legal analysis began with the
premise established by Katz and Maryland v. Smith that the Fourth
Amendment is applicable only when the person subject to surveillance has a
legitimate, justifiable, or reasonable expectation of privacy.34 The Court
reasoned that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, no reasonable privacy
interest exists in the movement of a vehicle traveling on a public roadway
because drivers voluntarily convey to the public their location and direction
23. Id.
24. Id. at 278-79.
25. Id. at 279.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 276.
28. Id. at 278.
29. David A. Sullivan, A Bright Line in the Sky? Toward a Aewt Fourth Amendment Search Standard
for Advancing Surveillance Technology, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 967, 969 n. 10 (2002).
30. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 285.
33. Id. at 281.
34. Id. at 280 81 (citing Maryland v. Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
GOLDFINGER-ERA TRACKING
of travel. 35  The voluntary act of traveling on public roads is the Fourth
Amendment equivalent of the voluntary act of providing phone number
information to the phone company described in Maryland v. Smith.36
The key premise to the analysis of Knotts is that persons have no
legitimate expectation of privacy in their location if they could lawfully be
viewed by law enforcement. 37 The Court explained:
Visual surveillance from public places. . . would have sufficed to reveal all of
these facts to the police. The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on
visual surveillance, but on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of [the]
automobile to the police receiver, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology
afforded them in this case.
38
Implicit in this premise is that law enforcement is permitted to use
technology to enhance visual surveillance. The Court compared the use of
the beeper to the permissible use of a searchlight to observe contraband on
the deck of a ship, which it had previously held as constitutional.39 In other
cases, the Court has permitted, for example, the use of airplanes to conduct
aerial surveillance. 40 A beeper, like an airplane, is just another tool for
better visual surveillance.
The Knotts Court stopped short of explicitly approving the type of
surveillance permitted by GPS devices. 41  The defendant argued that
permitting the use of electronic tracking devices would inevitably lead to
24-hour surveillance of any citizen without a warrant.42 The Court reserved
that issue, saying, in response, "if such dragnet type law enforcement
practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be
time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles
may be applicable., 43  Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion to
35. Id. at 281-82. The driver also voluntarily conveys his "final destination when he exit[s] from
public roads onto private property." Id. at 282.
36. Id. at 283 (quoting Maryland v. Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
37. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
38. Id. The fact that visual surveillance failed in this case, and the beeper allowed the officers to obtain
information they would not have obtained with electronic support, was inconsequential. Id. It was
sufficient, in the Court's view, that the officers "could have observed" the vehicle at all times. Id.
(emphasis added).
39. 460 U.S. at 283 (citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
40. See, e.g., Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (permitting the use by law
enforcement of aerial photography and surveillance).
41. 460 U.S. at 283.
42. Id. (citing to Brief for Respondent at 9, Knotts v. United States, 460 U.S. 276 (1982) (No. 81-
1802)).
43. 460 U.S. at 283 84 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978) (the "reality
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emphasize his view that police use of technology for surveillance purposes
could have a limit.44 He said, "Although the augmentation in this case was
unobjectionable, it by no means follows that the use of electronic detection
techniques does not implicate especially sensitive concerns. 45
A little over a year later, the Court again considered whether the
46
warrantless monitoring of a beeper violated the Fourth Amendment. In
United States v. Karo, law enforcement officers placed a beeper in a
container of chemicals to be used by suspected drug manufacturers. 47 The
officers initially observed the defendant pick up the container and then used
visual and electronic surveillance to follow him to his home.48  The
container was moved on several occasions without the knowledge of the
officers, but was located using the tracking device at private residences and
then at commercial storage facilities.49 Although the officers attempted to
conduct surveillance at the storage facility, the container was again moved
without the knowledge of the officers. 50  Using visual and beeper
surveillance, the officers were able to track a vehicle suspected of holding
the container to two other private residences. 51 The officers ceased tight
visual surveillance at the last location for fear of being discovered, and
instead, relied on the tracking device to determine that the container
remained inside the residence.52 Relying in part on information obtained
from the tracking device, the officers obtained a search warrant and
discovered drugs and laboratory equipment that led to the conviction of the
defendant on drug charges 3
As in Knotts, the opinion does not contain a detailed description of the
capabilities of the device. The opinion does note some limitations on the
device, including the fact that when the device was tracked to a commercial
storage facility, the police were unable to determine the precise storage unit
hardly suggests abuse")).
44. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 288 (1983).
45. Id. at 287 (Stevens, J., concurring).
46. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
47. Id. at 708-10. The drug dealers in Karo were using the chemical ether to remove cocaine from
clothing. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 709.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 708.
53. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 710 (1984).
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where it had been located. Accordingly, as in Knotts, the device in Karo
can fairly be described as "primitive" when compared to modern GPS
devices.55
The Karo Court reaffirmed the core holding of Knotts that there is no
Fourth amendment violation where the beeper provided information that
,,56
could have been "observed by the naked eye. However, the facts of the
case were distinguished in one important manner from Knotts. In Karo,
unlike in Knotts, the tracking device provided the officers with information
that the container remained in private residences, a fact that could not have
been obtained from lawful visual surveillance. 7 The question in Karo was
thus whether "the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location
not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of
those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence., 58 The
Court concluded that such surveillance without a warrant violates the
Fourth Amendment. 59 The Court explained:
The beeper tells the agent that a particular article is actually located at a
particular time in the private residence and is in the possession of the person or
persons whose residence is being watched. Even if visual surveillance has
revealed that the article to which the beeper is attached has entered the house,
the later monitoring not only verifies the officers' observations but also
establishes that the article remains on the premises.... The monitoring of an
electronic device such as a beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale
search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises that
the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have
otherwise obtained without a warrant.
6 0
The practical result of Karo is that the Court will continue to permit the
warrantless use of primitive electronic tracking devices so long as the
devices are not used to obtain information about the interior of private
residences. 6'
54. Id. at 709-10.
55. Sullivan, supra note 29, at 969.
56. 468 U.S. at 714; see United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126 27 (9th Cir. 1999) (in placing a
tracking device, officers did not infringe on any area of vehicle owner intended to shield from public
view).
57. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 706.
60. Id. at 715.
61. 468 U.S. at 716. The Court was similarly protective of the interior of a residence against
surveillance by electronic devices in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that law
enforcement could not use thermal imagers to obtain information about the inside of residences without
a warrant).
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II. JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF KNOTTS AND KARO To GPS DEVICES
A. Federal Court Applications of Knotts and Karo
Prior to August 2010, based on Knotts and Karo, federal courts
considering the question of GPS monitoring have universally permitted the
placement and use of the devices on vehicles parked and traveling on public
streets. On the appellate level, the Seventh, " Eighth,
63 and Ninth Circuits64
have explicitly permitted law enforcement to use GPS tracking on vehicles
without a warrant.
The District Court's approach in United States v. Williams is typical of
65the approach followed by federal courts. In Williams, a defendant
challenged the warrantless placement of GPS tracking devices on his
vehicles.66 Two GPS devices were externally attached to his car by police,
including one while the defendant and other suspects were attending a
62. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). Questioning whether the Knotts doctrine was
applicable to GPS tracking devices, the Seventh Circuit reasoned:
There is a practical difference lurking here, however. It is the difference between, on the
one hand, police trying to follow a car in their own car, and, on the other hand, using
cameras (whether mounted on lampposts or in satellites) or GPS devices. In other words,
it is the difference between the old technology-the technology of the internal combustion
engine-and newer technologies (cameras are not new, of course, but coordinating the
images recorded by thousands of such cameras is).
Id. at 997. The court ultimately held that Knotts permits the use of GPS tracking devices, but observed
that the beeper in Knotts was "only a modest improvement over following a car by means of unaided
human vision," while GPS tracking permitted "an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have
been prohibitively expensive." Id. at 998.
63. United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that police could place a GPS
device on a truck in a parking lot, then monitor the truck traveling back and forth across state lines).
The police in Marquez accessed the device seven times to change the battery - all while the truck was
parked in a public place. Id. at 607. The Marquez court described GPS devices as "merely allow[ing]
police to reduce the costs of lawful surveillance." Id. at 610.
64. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) (observing that "the only
information the agents obtained by the tracking devices was a log of the locations where [the
defendant's] car traveled, information the agents could have obtained from following the car."). But see
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that GPS devices have "little in common with the primitive
devices in Knotts," and arguing that "[t]here is something creepy and un-American about such
clandestine and underhanded behavior").
65. United States v. Williams, 650 F. Supp. 2d 633 (W.D. Ky. 2009).
66. Id. at 652. The police sought and obtained a warrant to attach a GPS device to the electrical system
of one of the co-defendants. Id. at 645. The defendant, a "career criminal" was able to defeat traditional
visual surveillance through "evasive driving tactics." Id. at 644. When the defendant was arrested for
driving with a suspended license, the police decided to tow the car to police headquarters to attach
tracking device to the electrical system of the automobile. Id. at 643. Cf Commonwealth v. Connolly,
913 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 2009) (holding that where a GPS device required the use of the defendant's
vehicle's electrical system, the actions of the police constituted a seizure).
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football game.6' The court rejected this challenge. 68 The court reasoned
that the officers were "merely use[ing] a radio transmitter to maintain
surveillance of a vehicle traveling on public streets and highways. 69
Relying on Knotts, the court held that the defendant "simply has no
protected expectation that the exterior of his automobile, while located on a
public area, will constitutionally be protected from even the most minor,
momentary incidental contact."' The court explained that when the device
was installed, the defendant's vehicle "could be seen and approached by
any passing stranger., 71 Other federal courts have applied Knotts in the
72same manner, permitting the warrantless use of GPS devices.
B. State Court Applications of Knotts and Karo
In contrast to the federal cases described above, a number of state courts
have declined to follow Knotts in regards to GPS devices.73 Rather than
directly address the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment analysis, these
state courts have relied upon state constitutional provisions that provide
protections against warrantless searches. The Washington Supreme
Court, for example, has held that the Washington Constitution prohibits the
installation of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle without a warrant.75 In its
ruling, the court accepted the premise underlying Knotts that no search
occurs when officers can lawfully observe the suspect, even with the use of
binoculars and flashlights. 6 However, the Washington Supreme Court was
unwilling to extend this doctrine to GPS devices:
67. Williams, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
68. Id. at 663.
69. Id. at 667.
70. Id. at 669.
71. Id. at 668.
72. See United States v. Coulombe, No. 1:06-CR-343, 2007 WL 4192005, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,
2007) ("There is no Fourth [A]mendment violation when the installation of a tracking device on a
vehicle's undercarriage does not damage the vehicle or invade its interior."); United States v. Moran,
349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (tracking GPS device on public roads is permissible because
officers could have conducted surveillance by following vehicle).
73. See Sarah Ralter, Privacy Implications of GPS Tracking Technology, 4 J. L. & POcLY INFO. SOC'Y
755, 763 66 (2008) (discussing cases regarding the government's collection of GPS data). But see State
v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53, 59-60 (Wisc. App. 2009) (permitting GPS search but noting that [w]e are
more than a little troubled by the conclusion that no Fourth amendment search or seizure occurs when
police use a GPS or similar device").
74. Id.
75. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
76. Id. at 223.
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[W]hen a GPS device is attached to a vehicle, law enforcement officers do not
in fact follow the vehicle. Thus, unlike binoculars or a flashlight, the GPS
device does not merely augment the officers' senses, but rather provides a
technological substitute for traditional visual tracking.... We perceive a
difference between the kind of uninterrupted 24 hour surveillance possible
through use of a GPS device, which does not depend upon whether an officer
could in fact have maintained visual contact over the tracking period, and an
.... 77
officer's use of binoculars or a flashlight to augment his or her senses.
In reaching its conclusion, the court expressed concern that the use of
GPS devices is "particularly intrusive" 78 and makes it possible for the
government "to acquire an enormous amount of personal information about
the citizen." 9
A similar conclusion was reached recently by the New York Court of
Appeals in People v. Weaver.80 The Weaver court distinguished the
technology used in Knotts on the grounds that "GPS is a vastly different and
exponentially more sophisticated technology that is easily and cheaply
deployed and has virtually unlimited and remarkably precise tracking
capability."'" The New York court concluded that GPS permits the police
to obtain information beyond what visual surveillance can obtain. 82 The
court explained:
It is, of course, true, that the expectation of privacy has been deemed
diminished in a car upon a public thoroughfare. But it is one thing to suppose
that the diminished expectation affords a police officer certain well-
circumscribed options for which a warrant is not required and quite another to
suppose that when we drive or ride in a vehicle our expectations of privacy are
so utterly diminished that we effectively consent to the unsupervised disclosure
to law enforcement authorities of all that GPS technology can and will reveal.
83
The Weaver court concluded that the nature of the surveillance permitted
by GPS devices, unlike the type of surveillance presented by the tracking
device in Knotts, infringed on both a subjective and an objective
expectation of privacy.8 4 Accordingly, the use of such devices constituted a
search without a warrant and thus prohibited by the New York
Constitution.8'
77. Id. at 223.
78. Id. at 222 (quoting State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994)).
79. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003).
80. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009).
81. Id. at 1199.
82. Id. at 1200.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1200 01.
85. Id. at 1201.
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III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S REJECTION OF THE APPLICATION OF KAOTTS AND
KARO TO GPS DEVICES
In August 2010, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Maynard, became the first federal court to hold that the use of a GPS
tracking device without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 6  In
Maynard, the defendant was under investigation for suspected drug
87offenses. As part of the investigation, officers installed a GPS device on
his vehicle and tracked his movements for four weeks.88
The D.C. Circuit Court declined to apply Knotts to GPS tracking
devices. 89  Instead, the court interpreted Knotts narrowly. The Maynard
court reasoned that in Knotts, the Supreme Court "explicitly distinguished
between the limited information discovered by use of the beeper -
movements during a discrete journey - and more comprehensive or
sustained monitoring of the sort at issue in this case." 90  The court then
limited Knotts to holding that a person had no reasonable expectation of
privacy where police use a tracking device to augment visual surveillance
over a discrete and limited period of time. 9'
The Maynard court then concluded that people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the totality of their movements over the course of
a period of time.92 The court distinguished the core holdings of Knotts and
Karo that people have has no expectation of privacy in movements that
are exposed to the public - on the grounds that "the whole of one's
movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public
because the likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is
effectively nil. 93 The court explained:
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone during a
single journey as he goes to the market or returns home from work. It is another
thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the scent again the next day and the
86. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
87. Id. at 549.
88. Id. at 555.
89. Id. at 554.
90. Id. at 556 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283, 284 85).
91. 615 F.3d 544, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing inter alia United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1518 n.4
(1984)); see People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009). The Maynard court distinguished
previous Circuit Court opinions, on the grounds that none of those decisions explicitly addressed the
issue of long-term surveillance, in part because of concessions made by defendants on this issue. See
supra notes 51-53.
92. 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
93. Id. at 558.
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day after that, week in and week out, dogging his prey until he has identified all
the places, people, amusements, and chores that make up that person's hitherto
private routine.
According to the Maynard court, the difference between discrete and
long-term surveillance is significant, because "the whole of one's
movements.., reveals more - sometimes a great deal more - than does the
sum of its parts." 95 The court said,
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and
what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about
a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a
church, a gym. a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does
one's not visiting any of these places over the course of a month. The sequence
of a person's movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist's
office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a
visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of
another's travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy
drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving
medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups
and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts. 96
Despite Knotts, the Maynard court concluded that the expectation of
privacy against extended and comprehensive surveillance is legitimate
under the Katz test. 97 This privacy interest is legitimate because, the court
reasoned, while there is no expectation of privacy in individual movements
in public, prolonged surveillance can reveal additional information not
94. Id. at 560.
95. Id. at 558.
96. Id. at 562. Julian Sanchez, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, provided an illustrative
hypothetical:
Alice and Bob are having a romantic affair that, for whatever reason, they prefer to keep
secret. One evening betore a planned date, Bob stops by the corner pharmacy and in
full view of a shop full of strangers-buys some condoms. He then drives to a restaurant
where, again in full view of the other patrons, they have dinner together. They later drive
in separate cars back to Alice's house, where the neighbors (if they care to take note) can
observe from the presence of the car in the driveway that Alice has an evening guest for
several hours. It being a weeknight, Bob then returns home, again by public roads .... In
ordinary life, we often reasonably suppose the privacy or secrecy of certain facts-that
Bob and Alice are having an affair that could in principle be inferred from the
combination of other facts that are (severally) clearly public, because it would be highly
unusual for all of them to be observed by the same public.
Julian Sanchez, GPS Tracking and a Mosaic Theory' of Government Searches, Cato a Liberty, Aug.
11, 2010, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/gps-tracking-and-a-mosaic-theory-of-government-searches (last
visited Aug. 22, 2010).
97. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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available to the public.98 In this view, "the intrusion such monitoring makes
into the subject's private affairs stands in stark contrast to the relatively
brief intrusion at issue in Knotts."99
A federal district court followed the Maynard analysis in reviewing an
application by the Federal Government for a court order pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703(c)-(d) directing a cell phone company to provide location
information for all calls made by a cell phone. 00 In denying the request,
the court noted a "changing legal landscape" and relied heavily on the
analysis on Maynard. 10 1 Finding that the Maynard court had "persuasively"
distinguished Knotts,102 the district court followed the conclusion that
"prolonged surveillance reveals information that differs in kind, not just in
degree, from the results of any short-term surveillance."1
0 3
IV. THE FUTURE OF WARRANTLESS GPS TRACKING
Knotts and Karo were correct decisions for the primitive tracking devices
of the Goldfinger era. Reasonable expectations of privacy at that time were
governed by the technological limitations of the devices available to law
enforcement.10 4 In particular, the devices could only be used to supplement
and aid traditional visual surveillance, as they were unable to record data on
a vehicles movement without human intervention. 15  In this respect, the
devices were really only useful to aid investigations into particular
suspicions of criminal conduct.
Our time is different. Just as the character of James Bond has changed
for the Twenty-first Century, 16  Maynard and Weaver represent a
98. Id. at 563 64.
99. Id. at 563.
100. In re United States Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MJ-0550,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88781, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010); see alsosupra note 8.
101. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88781, at *5-7. The court noted that the law in this area "remains
unsettled" and that "[t]he result.., has been an unpredictable legal regime in which an individual's right
to privacy waxes and wanes based on the fortuity of the location in which an investigation is based and
of each district court's system for assigning miscellaneous criminal duty to its judges." ld.; see also
supra notes 11 12 and accompanying text.
102. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88781, at *15.
103. Id., at *17-18. Other courts have declined to follow the Maynard analysis. See, e.g.,
United States v. Walker, No. 2:10-cr-32, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13760, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11,
2011) ("[T]he great weight of the law from other federal circuits rejects this view." (citations omitted)).
104. Tarik N. Jallad, Note, Old Answers to New Questions: GPS Surveillance and the Unwarranted
needfor Warrants, 11 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 351,366-67 (2010).
105. Id. at 367.
106. See e.g., David Gritten, James Bond: why the blue-eyed Bond is a hit, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 20,
2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/film/3562316J ames-Bond-why-the-blue-eyed-
Bond-is-a-hit.html (noting that Daniel Craig as James Bond represents "an end to all that prescriptive
2011]
416 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIV:401
conception of the reasonable expectation of privacy more suited for the
technology of our age. A homeland security blog noted that "[a]dvances in
technology - especially, technologies put to use by law enforcement I
continue to erode privacy, and the latest such advance to draw attention I
and consternation - is GPS."10 7 Unlike the devices at issue in Knotts and
Karo, GPS devices permit law enforcement to conduct surveillance beyond
a targeted investigation into a certain crime. Instead, the devices could
permit law enforcement to undertake surveillance of a particular individual
over an extended period of time in the hope of piecing together evidence of
illegal conduct, including evidence of illegal conduct that was not even
suspected prior to the surveillance.10 8
Maynard and Weaver do not represent a significant departure from
traditional Fourth amendment jurisprudence in favor of a "mosaic theory,"
as some have suggested. 0 9  Under the mosaic theory of the Fourth
brand-name fetishism about suits, weaponry, drinks and other accoutrements deemed crucial for a
fictional British spy, first imagined during the height of the Cold War in the early 1950s"); David
Ansen, Battle of the Bonds, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2008/ 11/12/battle-of-the-bonds.html ("'Casino Royale' pumped fresh (and
real) blood into the series, scraping away the barnacles of camp and gadgetry and replacing the stale air
of a Hugh Hefner bachelor party with Craig's urgent, contemporary virility.").
107. HOMELAND SECURITY NEWSWIRE, DEEP JUDICIAL DISAGREEMENTS OVER INCREASED POLICE USE
OF GPS SURVEILLANCE, Aug. 16, 2010, http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/deep-judicial-
disagreements-over-increased-police-use-gps-surveillance ("This is part of a more general trend,
because the growing use by the police of new technologies that make surveillance easier and cheaper to
conduct is raising difficult questions about the scope of constitutional privacy rights, leading to
disagreements among judges.").
108. 6] FED. R. CrFM. P. 41(C) (A warrant may be issued for any of the following: (1) evidence of a
crime; (2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed; (3) property designed for use,
intended for use, or used in committing a crime; or (4) a person to be arrested or a person who is
unlawfully restrained).
109. Professor Orin Kerr posted critical comments about the decision on the Volkoh Conspiracy blog:
Maynard introduces a novel theory of the Fourth Amendment: That whether government
conduct is a search is measured not by whether a particular individual act is a search, but
rather whether an entire course of conduct, viewed collectively, amounts to a search.
That is, individual acts that on their own are not searches, when committed in some
particular combinations, become searches. Thus in Maynard, the court does not look at
individual recordings of data from the GPS device and ask whether they are searches.
Instead, the court looks at the entirety of surveillance over a one-month period and views
it as one single "thing."
Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-
mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search/#more-35137
(Aug. 6, 2010, 14:46 EST) (last visited Aug. 12, 2010). But see Posting of Kip F. Wainscott to
American Constitution Society Blog,
http://acslaw.org/node/i 3444?gclid-CKvJ I 8mDzqMCFUf75wodBn5YuA (May 19, 2009, 11:52 EST).
While the reasonable expectation of privacy is certainly an evolving standard, the time
has come to recognize that government GPS tracking offends this expectation. Although
a number of empirical studies support this proposition, it does not require scientific
evidence to understand that the "Big Brother" of Orwell's 1984 retains its emotive power
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Amendment, the evaluation of whether an expectation of privacy is
considered to be reasonable is based not on a single act, but on the
cumulative effect of a series of acts.110  From a law enforcement
perspective, individual acts and procedures that are, by themselves, lawful
may be found to violate the Fourth Amendment when viewed
collectively.'11
Maynard and Weaver, hold that, in the GPS context, a reviewing court
must examine the entirety of surveillance over a period of time to determine
if a search has occurred. However, this approach need not be applied to
aggregations of other law enforcement techniques, such as a review of bank
records. Instead, the Katz approach remains viable and preferable because
it was based, in part, on a recognition that technological advances in
surveillance techniques made possible intrusive government interference
with privacy without a physical invasion.'1 3  In the Katz decision, this
precisely because people expect that they enjoy freedom from extensive technological
tracking by the government.
GPS technology presents a very powerful and exciting tool for law enforcement in this
country. But, as Judge Posner himself aptly recognized in Garcia, "the meaning of a
Fourth Amendment search must change to keep pace with the march of science."
Id.
110. An appropriate similar situation is seen in the criminal law of telephone harassment. A single
telephone call is legal, but a series of telephone calls, when viewed together, may constitute telephone
harassment.
111. Cf PRISCILLA SMITH ET AL., WHEN MACHINES ARE WATCHING: How WARRANTLESS USE OF
GPS SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY TERMINATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH 1 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylas/2 (arguing that
a warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment because "the type and scope of information collected
by prolonged automated GPS surveillance enables governments to monitor a person's political
associations, their medical conditions and their amorous interests, in a way that invades their privacy
and chills expression of other fundamental rights").
112. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565-66 (D.C. Cir. 2010); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d
1195, 1202 (N.Y. 2009). This is the approach suggested by a recent decision by a federal magistrate in
New York. In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., No. I I-MC-01 13, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15457 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011). In that case,
involving a request for historical cell phone tracking data, the Magistrate Judge noted a "shorter time
period of the surveillance at issue here distinguishes the instant application from the ones that I have
denied on constitutional grounds." Id, at *2. He explained:
The government does not seek location tracking records for a single mobile phone over a
continuous period of 21 days; instead, it seeks records for one telephone for a three-day
period and a separate six-day period weeks later, and also the records of a different
telephone (albeit one allegedly used by the same investigative subject) for a twelve-day
period several months later. Even if it would be just as impractical for the government to
conduct physical surveillance in lieu of electronic tracking for such shorter periods, I
cannot assume that the information gleaned over such shorter periods, separated by
breaks of weeks or months, would necessarily be as revealing as the sustained month-
long monitoring at issue in Maynard.
Id., at *6 7.
113. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Subtler and
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meant that the Court examined not whether the government had violated a
person's property interest in a phone booth, but whether it had violated a
person's legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone booth.11 4 The Katz
Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment broadly protects from
government intrusion that which a person reasonably seeks to keep
private. 15  The Court did not closely examine the means by which the
government obtained the content of the target's conversations but, instead,
focused on whether the suspect had a legitimate expectations of privacy in
the conversation.1 6 The general principal, thus, remains unchanged: the
legitimacy of a citizen's expectation of privacy in a particular place may be
affected by the nature of the intrusion that occurs.
The protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, as the Court has
often recognized, change to meet new technology. The Maynard court's
approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
decisions and most likely represents the direction future courts will take on
this issue. It is important to recognize that the Maynard court, as well as
Weaver and other similar state courts, were not confronted with a discrete
use of a GPS device to track, for example, the proceeds of a single drug
transaction or a single stolen vehicle." 7  Rather, these cases involved
sustained and long-term surveillance of a targeted individual unrelated to
any particular criminal action. Viewed this way, the use of GPS tracking
devices for long-term surveillance is not merely an enhancement of the type
of surveillance traditionally conducted by police, as no police agency could
deploy the skill and resources to, undetected, record the type or amount of
information provided by a GPS tracking device. And, perhaps more
importantly for the Katz analysis, no reasonable person would expect to be
the target of such a massive police surveillance operation. Accordingly,
because the use of these devices infringes on a legitimate expectation of
privacy, their use constitutes a search requiring a warrant absent the
presence of another exception.' 8
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government. Discovery and
invention have made it possible for the government, by means far more effective than stretching upon
the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.").
114. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
115. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 362.
117. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195,
1195 (N.Y. 2009).
118. Other traditional Fourth Amendment exceptions, such as exigent circumstances, could still justify
the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device.
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CONCLUSION
Courts will continue to struggle with Knotts and Karo. These cases were
decided on the basis of primitive tracking devices. In contrast, modern GPS
tracking devices permit law enforcement to conduct surveillance beyond a
targeted investigation into a discrete crime. In evaluating the warrantless
use of GPS devices, courts should be cognizant of the observation in
Maynard, Weaver, and other decisions that that people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the totality of their movements over the course of
a period of time. Future courts, applying the Katz analysis, are likely to
conclude that the use of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle constitutes a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

